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Dictionaries are word museums. Like archaeologists at a dig, lexicogra­
phers mine the language through the eons for patterns of usage. Language 
evolves, and yesterday's meaning may disguise today's nuance.
' 
The claims of a patent are central to virtually every aspect of patent law. 
The claims define the scope of the invention, and their meaning therefore 
determines both whether a defendant's product infringes a patent and 
whether the patent is valid. One of the most significant aspects of patent 
litigation is "claim construction," the process of defining the words of the 
claim in other, theoretically clearer words.2 Courts construe the claims of the 
t © 2005 Mark A. Lemley. 
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I. Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Am. Farm Bureau Fed'n, 876 F.2d 599, 600 (7th Cir. 1989). 
2. See Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) ("[T]he construction of claims is simply a way of elaborating the normally terse claim lan­
guage ... . "). One may reasonably doubt whether layering new words on top of old necessarily adds 
to the clarity of the claims. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Quantum Patent Mechanics, 9 
LEWIS & Ct.ARK L. REv. 29 (2005); Craig Allen Nard, A Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. 
J.L. & TECH. 1, 44 (2000) (rejecting the idea of a plain meaning in claim construction); cf William 
N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 Cot.UM. L. REV. 609, 679 (1990) (explaining 
101 
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patent by starting with the plain meaning of their terms as they would be 
understood by a person having ordinary skill in the art, or PHOSITA. Claim 
construction occurs in every patent case during a "Markman hearing."3 In­
deed, claim construction is so important to patent litigation that once the 
court construes the claims, most patent cases settle,4 and those that do not 
are often decided on summary judgment.5 As Judge Rich succinctly put it, 
"the name of the game is the claim."6 
In order to construe the claims of a patent, the court must fix the mean­
ing of the claim terms as of a particular point in time. Both the knowledge 
of the PHOSITA in a particular field and the meaning of particular terms to 
that PHOSITA will frequently change over time.7 Indeed, the risk of change 
in the meaning of terms over time is particularly great in patent law, because 
patents necessarily involve new ideas, and the process of assigning terms to 
describe those new ideas is not static. As the Supreme Court recognized 
many years ago, "it does not follow that when a newly invented or discov­
ered thing is called by some familiar word, which comes nearest to 
expressing the new idea, that the thing so styled is really the thing formerly 
meant by the familiar word."8 In that case, the Court found that the meaning 
of the term "bridge" in a 1790 statute did not mean the same thing in 1860 
after the development of railroad bridges. The term was the same, but its 
scope had changed over time in response to changes in technology. 
But at which point in time shall we fix the meaning of the claims? It is a 
fundamental principle of patent law that the time as of which we determine 
how dictionaries don't avoid the problem of subjectivity of language, because the decisionmaker 
must choose among different definitions based on their own subjective understanding of meaning). 
3. In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996), the Supreme Court 
decided that construction of the claims of the patent was a question of law for the court, just as 
courts are responsible for construing other legal documents such as statutes and contracts. As a 
result, courts hold pretrial "Markman hearings" to define the meaning of the claims. 
4. For example, Kimberly Moore found that cases settled earlier in the Northern District of 
California, which has regimented procedures requiring disclosure of infringement and validity con­
tentions and a relatively early Markman hearing, and later in the District of Delaware, which often 
delays the Markman hearing until just before (or even during) trial. Kimberly A. Moore, Forum 
Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Af ect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REv. 889, 911 
(2001); see also DAVID F. HERR, ANNOTATED MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION§ 33.223, at 649 
(4th ed. 2005) ("Early claim construction may also facilitate settlement . ... "). The overwhelming 
majority of patent lawsuits settle before trial. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the 
Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REv. 1495, 1501 (2001) ("The overwhelming majority of [patent] law­
suits settle or are abandoned before trial."); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases­
An Empirical Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365 (2000). 
5. See HERR, supra note 4, at 649. 
6. Giles S. Rich. Extent of Protection and Intemretation of Claims-American Perspectives, 
21 INT'L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990). 
7. See, e.g., Joshua D. Sarnoff, Abolishing the Doctrine of Equivalents and Claiming the 
Future After Festo, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1157 (2004). 
8. Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. (I Wall.) 116, 147 (1864); see also Bischoff 
v. Wethered, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 812, 816 (1869); Samuel A. Thumrna & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The 
Lexicon Has Become a Fonress: The United States Supreme Coun's Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. 
L. REv. 227, 299 (1999) (noting the Supreme Court's reliance on contemporaneous dictionaries to 
interpret statutes). 
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the meaning of claim terms varies depending on what legal rule is at issue. 
Where the question is one of novelty or nonobviousness-whether the in­
vention is truly new-the courts compare the patented invention to the prior 
art as both were understood at the time of the invention. Where the question 
is one of enablement or written description-whether the inventor under­
stood and described the invention in sufficient detail--courts evaluate the 
adequacy of the disclosure based on the meaning of the claims at the time 
the patent application was filed. Where the question involves the meaning of 
a special patent claim element called a "means-plus-function" claim, courts 
evaluate the scope of that claim element at the time the patent issues. And 
where the question involves alleged infringement of the patent, courts evalu­
ate infringement in at least some circumstances based on the meaning of the 
claim at the time of infringement. What claim terms would mean to one of 
ordinary skill in the art therefore may depend on what legal rule is at issue, 
and therefore the time as of which we ask the question. 
An equally fundamental principle of patent law is that patent claims 
must be construed as an integrated whole. A patent claim may not be treated 
"like a nose of wax which may be turned and twisted in any direction, by 
merely referring to the specification, so as to make it include something 
more than, or something different from, what its words express."
9 
In particu­
lar, patentees (or accused infringers, for that matter) are not permitted to 
argue that a patent claim means one thing when it comes to validity and 
something else entirely when it comes to infringement. Instead, courts give 
claims a single meaning in any given case, engaging in only one act of claim 
construction for any given patent. Under this principle, patent claim terms 
have a single definite meaning. In part this is a matter of fundamental fair­
ness-a sense that what's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. But it 
is also necessary if a patent is to put the public on notice of what the pat­
entee owns. 
These two principles contradict each other. The meaning of technologi­
cal terms is fluid. A term that means one thing to scientists at one time may 
mean something different later as understanding in the field increases. Be­
cause both patent prosecution and patent litigation can take years and even 
decades, 10 fixing the time at which we determine the meaning of any given 
term may tum out to matter in a substantial number of cases. When the 
9.  White v .  Dunbar, 1 19 U.S. 47, 5 1  (1 886). 
10.  Patent prosecution takes just u nder three years o n  average, see John R. Allison & Mark 
A. Lemley, Who's Patenting What? An Empirical Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. 
REV. 2099, 2 1 1 8  (2000) [here inafter A llison & Lemley, Who's Patenting What?], but the practice of 
"continuation" applications can extend that to decades. See Mark A. Lemley & Kimberly A. Moore, 
Ending Abuse of Patent Continuations, 84 B.U. L. REv. 63, 1 21-23 (2004) (documenting patent 
applications taking as Jong as 68 years to issue). Once the patent issues, it takes time for the patentee 
to detect infringement and sue, and more time for the case to be resolved. As a result, the e lapsed 
t ime between the first fi ling of a patent application and the final resolution of a case that goes to 
judgment is a mean of 12 .3 years and a median of 1 1 .3 years. John R. A llison & Mark A. Lemley, 
Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 A IPLA Q.J. 1 85, 236 tbl. 1 1  ( 1 998) 
[hereinafter Allison & Lemley, Empirical Evidence]. 
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meaning of a patent claim term changes over time, the first principle would 
give that term a different meaning for validity purposes than for infringe­
ment purposes. But in doing so, the court would undermine the second 
principle, since the claim term will not mean the same thing for all pur­
poses, and it may indeed be impossible to determine the scope of a patent at 
all on an ex ante basis. 
This tension has been latent for some time, but it came to a head in Su­
pe rguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enterprises.
11 In that case, the question was 
whether a 1985 patent application that used the claim term "regularly re­
ceived television signal" could be construed to cover digital television 
signals that were not developed until well after the patent issued. The Fed­
eral Circuit held that it could, relying on the well-established principle that 
the meaning of the claim term for infringement purposes was determined as 
of the time of infringement, not the earlier filing date. Judge Michel dis­
sented. He started with the assumption that the meaning of the claims was 
fixed as of 1985, and concluded that the claim language in question would 
not have been understood in 1985 to cover digital television. Both the ma­
jority and the dissent are correct within their own spheres; their 
disagreement comes from the fact that they start from fundamentally differ­
ent principles. Other cases have presented the same problem.12 
In Part I of this paper, I document the distinguished pedigree of both 
principles. In Part II, I argue that patent claim terms should have a fixed 
meaning throughout time and that this meaning should be fixed at the time 
the patent application is first filed. Part II also discusses some complications 
11. 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004 ). 
12. See PC Connector Solutions LLC v. Smartdisk Corp. , 406 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (finding that claim language referring to an J/O port "normally connectible to a conventional 
computer input/output port" required connectibility to a "port that was in common use at the time of 
filing in 1988"); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2000). In Schering, 
the question was the meaning of the term "IFN-a," which was originally used to refer to a particular 
type of interferon but was ultimately understood by scientists to refer to several different classes of 
proteins, of which the patentee was only concerned with one. The court held that "[t]he [claim] term 
as used in the . . .  patent . . .  did not and could not enlarge the scope of the patent to embrace tech­
nology arising after its filing." Id. at 1353; see Robin Feldman, Rethinking Rights in Biospace, S. 
CAL. L. REV (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript at 24-26, on file with author) (discussing this case). 
Cf. Middleton, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 311 F.3d 1384, 1389 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (referring 
interchangeably to the invention date and the filing date as the relevant time for fixing meaning). 
The question was also squarely presented in Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 
(Fed. Cir. 2004), but the court declined to resolve the "dilemma" of "this complex claim construc­
tion question," deciding instead to affirm the jury's finding that the patent was invalid for failure to 
describe and enable the full scope of the claims. Id. at 1258. Since the invalidity findings depended 
on the meaning of the claims, which in tum depended on the time at which they were construed, it 
seems the court should have resolved the issue. 
The JYI'O has recognized the problem in one specific context-patent claims that include as an 
element a trademarked product such as Teflon or Velcro. The JYI'O forbids such references because it 
recognizes that the composition of the product referred to by the trademark may change over time. 
U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMIN­
ING PROCEDURE § 608.0l(v) {8th ed., rev. 2 2004). I am indebted to Shashank Upadhye for this 
example. 
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that arise as a result of the prosecution process and how to deal with the 
problem of later-developed technology. 
I. PRINCIPLES OF CLAIM CONSTRUCTION 
A. Situating the Meaning of Claim Terms in Time 
Claim construction is a versatile creature, underlying virtually every 
doctrine in patent law. The role of claim construction is always to define the 
scope of the claims, though the reasons we want to define that scope differ 
depending on the legal rule in question. In this Section, I discuss the most 
common cases in which claim construction affects substantive patent deter­
minations of validity or infringement. In each case, the application of the 
legal principle is bound up with the understanding of a hypothetical person 
having ordinary skill in the art, or PHOSITA. 13 The role of the PHOSITA is 
significant for our purposes, because the meaning of claim terms is also de­
termined by asking what the PHOSITA would understand them to mean. 14 
There is a natural and understandable tendency to define the PHOSITA for 
claim construction purposes as the same person with the same knowledge as 
the PHOSITA for validity and infringement purposes, though that may in 
fact be an error. 15 
· 
1. Novelty and Nonobviousness 
In order to decide whether a patented invention is novel and nonobvious, 
we must know what the patent covers, because a patent covering a range of 
devices or chemicals will be held invalid if even a single one of those cov­
ered devices exists in the prior art. 16 Whether the device exists in the prior 
art for novelty purposes is determined by reading the relevant references 
to determine whether the PHOSITA would have understood that the refer­
ences taught the claimed invention. 17 Whether an invention is obvious is 
13. On the role of the PHOSITA in patent law, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, ls Patent 
Law Technology-Specific?, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155 (2002), and John 0. Tresansky, 
PHOSITA-The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. 
Soc'y 37 (1991). See also ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT§ 4.3 (5th ed. 
2001); Joseph P. Meara, Note, Just Who ls the Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art? Patent 
Law's Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. REv. 267 (2002). 
14. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 986 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en bane), 
ajf'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
15. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 13, at 1189-90 (noting that the two PHOSITAs are logi­
cally distinct). 
16. See In re Gosteli, 872 F.2d 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., No. M-
21-81BSJ, 2004 WL 1171254, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. May 25, 2004) ("Where a patent claims a genus, 
prior art disclosing even one species within the genus invalidates the entire claim."). 
17. See, e.g. , In re Wiggins, 488 F.2d 538 (C.C.P.A. 1973). One significant exception to this 
rule is the inherency doctrine, under which a prior art reference can anticipate a later invention if the 
invention was inherently present in the prior art and the public was receiving the benefit of the in­
vention, even if people weren't aware of it. See, e.g., In re Cruciferous Sprout Litig., 30 l F.3d 1343 
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determined by asking whether the PHOSITA would have found the differ­
ences between the prior art and the claimed invention obvious. 18 Novelty and 
nonobviousness are both determined as of the date of invention. 19 Because 
novelty and nonobviousness both focus on what the PHOSITA would under­
stand from the prior art at the time the invention was made, it seems to make 
sense that the meaning of claim terms should also be determined as of the 
date of invention. And indeed the Federal Circuit has held in the context of 
§§ 102 and 103 that "claims are to be given their ordinary and objective 
meaning as of the time of the invention."20 
2. Enablement and Written Description 
In order to decide whether a patentee has sufficiently disclosed and de­
scribed her invention, we must know what the patent covers, because the 
statute requires the patent to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make 
and use the full range of the claimed invention,21 and the court has construed 
the written description doctrine to require proof that the patentee possessed 
the full range of the claimed invention.22 Without knowing how broad the 
patent is, a court can't determine whether a person of ordinary skill in the art 
would be able to make and use the full range of the invention. Similarly, it 
would be impossible to know whether the patentee in fact possessed the in­
vention without defining the scope of that invention using the patent claims. 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that the patent on newly discovered cancer-fighting benefit of eating broc­
coli was anticipated because people have been eating broccoli and gaining the benefit for millennia, 
even if they weren't aware of the benefit). Under the inherency doctrine, the time at which the 
PHOSITA must understand that the invention was anticipated is delayed, but the time at which the 
anticipation itself is tested remains the time at which the invention is made. For a discussion of the 
contours of the inherency doctrine, see Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, WM. & MARY 
L. REv. (forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Inherency]. 
18. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2000). This is concededly a somewhat circular definition, and obvious­
ness, like negligence in tort law, is a somewhat broad-based inquiry. Courts have taken some steps to 
try to cabin the essential amorphousness of the doctrine. See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 
U.S. I (1966) (adding secondary or "objective" considerations to nonobviousness analysis); In re 
Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (requiring proof of motivation to combine in order to 
combine prior art references); In re Fine, 837 F.2d 1071, 1075 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (rejecting the "obvi­
ous to try" standard). But the underlying inquiry remains a judgment call based on what the 
PHOSITA would believe. 
19. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (g) (2000) (refusing to grant a patent if certain events occur 
"before the invention" by the patentee); 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000) (determining obviousness from 
the perspective of a person having ordinary skill in the art "at the time the invention was made."). 
A separate set of rules in section 102 deal not with prior art that predates the patentee's inven­
tion, but art that was created after the patentee's invention but more than a year before the patentee 
filed a patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). Section 102(b) involves what are known as 
statutory bars to patenting, rather than novelty per se. For purposes of section 102(b ), the meaning 
of claim terms is fixed as of the date the prior art becomes relevant--one year before the application 
is filed-rather than the date of invention. 
20. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 365 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Plant Ge­
netic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315 F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. 
Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
21. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000). 
22. See, e.g., In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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Satisfaction of the enablement and written description requirements is de­
termined at the time the patent application is first filed. 23 This is also true in 
other contexts in which enablement is at issue. In In re Hogan, for example, 
the court determined whether a patent applicant had enabled the claim in 
order to prevail in an interference proceeding (that is, whether he had in fact 
made the invention as claimed) by interpreting the term "polypropylene" as 
it was understood at the time the senior application was first filed, rather 
than as the term was later understood: 
[The] 1953 application enabled those skilled in the art in 1953 to make and 
use 'a solid polymer' as described in claim 13. Appellants disclosed, as the 
only then existing way to make such a polymer, a method of making the 
crystalline form. To now say that appellants should have disclosed in 1953 
the amorphous form which on this record did not exist until 1962, would 
be to impose an impossible burden on inventors and thus on the patent sys­
tem. 24 
Because the inquiry focuses on what the PHOSITA would understand at 
the time the patent application was filed, it seems to make sense that the 
meaning of claim terms should also be determined as of the date the appli­
cation was filed. And in fact the Federal Circuit has held in the context of 
§ 112 that the district court "properly gave objective meaning to [the claims] 
as they were understood at the time the patent application was filed."25 In­
deed, the court adopted this timing in Plant Genetics, the same case in 
which it held that § 102 determinations are based on the meaning of claim 
terms at the time of invention. Courts have also applied the filing date to the 
related doctrine of claim definiteness.26 
3. Means-Plus-Function Claims 
Patent claims generally define devices, structures, or methods. At times, 
however, patentees want to claim part of an invention by defining it in func­
tional terms (for example, "means for processing data") rather than by 
defining the actual structure of the device in the claim. Section 112, 'lI 6 of 
the patent statute permits a patentee to phrase claim elements in such a way 
and provides that the scope of such a claim element is determined by the 
corresponding structure described in the patent specification and equivalents 
23. See, e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563--M (Fed. Cir. 1991). Strictly 
speaking, satisfaction of those requirements is determined as of the earliest time to which the pat­
entee claims priority. In some cases, patent applicants may add new descriptive matter to their 
applications by filing what is called a "continuation-in-part" ("CIP") application. Claims in a CIP 
application must be enabled by the disclosure in the original application only if the patentee asserts 
that she invented the claimed subject matter as of the date of the original application. 
24. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977); accord United States Steel Corp. v. 
Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1251-52 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
25. Plant Genetic Sys., 315 F.3d at 1345; see also Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 
1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
26. Howmedica Osteonics Corp. v. Tranquil Prospects, Ltd., 401F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
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thereof.27 Thus, defining the scope of a patent claim term phrased in this 
"means-plus-function" format requires determining what the patentee dis­
closed in the specification, and what structures are equivalent to the ones 
disclosed. Understanding the scope of this type of claim requires determin­
ing what the PHOSITA would understand the specification to mean at the 
time the patent issues28 and what would be equivalent to the structures dis­
closed in the specification as of that time.29 Because of this, it makes a 
certain amount of sense that the meaning of particular terms in the patent 
should also be determined at the time the patent issues, and indeed the Fed­
eral Circuit has made it clear that the meaning of such means-plus-function 
claim terms is determined as of the time the patent issues.30 Unlike the valid­
ity doctrines discussed above, however, it is terms in the specification rather 
than claim terms themselves that are being construed. 
4. Infringement 
Finally, and most obviously, interpretation of patent claims is critical to 
deciding whether a defendant's product infringes the patent. Claim construc­
tion is often outcome-determinative in infringement cases; once the patent 
claims have been construed summary judgment for one side or the other is 
quite common. Claim construction determines the scope of the patent, and 
the scope of the patent in turn determines whether it covers the defendant's 
product. Whether an accused device infringes is tested as of the time of the 
alleged infringement; there are numerous cases in which devices first devel­
oped after the patent issues are nonetheless held to infringe the patent.31 
Indeed, the application of patents to technologies first developed after the 
patent issues is integral to a number of long-standing patent doctrines, in­
cluding the doctrine of equivalents, the rule of blocking patents, and the so-
27. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 6 (2000). 
28. See, e.g., Al-Site Corp. v. VSI Int'I, Inc., 174 F.3d 1308, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 1999) ("An 
equivalent structure or act under § 112 cannot embrace technology developed after the issuance of 
the patent because the literal meaning of a claim is fixed upon its issuance." (emphasis added)). 
29. Id. (noting that "a structural equivalent under§ 112 must have been available at the time 
of issuance of the claim"; any other equivalent can be captured only under the doctrine of equiva­
lents); accord Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Indus., Inc., 145 F.3d 1303, 1310 
(Fed. Cir. 1998). 
30. A l-Site, 174 F.3d at 1320. 
31. See, e.g., Laser Alignment, Inc. v. Woodruff & Sons, Inc., 491 F.2d 866 (7th Cir. 1974) 
(finding that a patent on using a beam of light to align pipe covered the use of a laser to align pipe, 
even though the laser had not been developed when the invention was made); In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 
595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (concluding that an invention enabled at an early time with narrow scope 
covered a broader scope of later-developed products that fit within the (expanded) literal definition 
of the claimed invention, and arguing that "[t]o restrict appellants to the crystalline form dis­
closed . . . would be a poor way to stimulate invention, and particularly to encourage its early 
disclosure. To demand such restriction is merely to state a policy against broad protection for pio­
neer inventions . . . .  "); Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (E.D. Cal. 2002) 
(interpreting a patent that, when written in 1984, covered only mouse-derived antibodies, to cover 
all sorts of antibodies developed between 1984 and 1999, including chimeric and humanized anti­
bodies). 
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called "reverse doctrine of equivalents."32 Testing infringement at the time of 
infringement necessarily suggests that the claims should be interpreted as of 
the time of infringement; it is the correspondence between the claims and 
the accused device that is the essence of infringement. And some courts 
have in fact construed the meaning of patent claims for infringement pur­
poses as of the time of infringement, not as of the time of invention, filing, 
or issue. In Laser Alignment, for example, the court interpreted the phrase 
"beam of light" to include a laser, a technology that did not exist at the time 
the patent issued.33 Other courts come to the same conclusion not with re­
spect to literal infringement but under the doctrine of equivalents, where it is 
well settled that the relevant time is the time of infringement. 34 
The timing of claim construction, then, would appear to vary depending 
on the reason the claim is being construed. For some purposes we under­
stand claim terms to mean what they meant to the PHOSITA at the time of 
invention. At other times we interpret claim terms as they are understood at 
the time the patent application is filed, at the time the patent issues, or at the 
time the patent is allegedly infringed. And because a significant period of 
time can elapse between each of these events-a year or two between inven­
tion and filing,35 2.77 years on average but sometimes more than ten years 
between filing and issue,36 and several years between issue and infringe­
ment31 -it is quite common that the meaning of claim terms will differ 
32. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 
75 Tux. L. REV. 989 (1997); Robert Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Break­
down: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. 
Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990). The reverse 
doctrine of equivalents excuses literal infringements where the defendant's product is so far changed 
in principle from the patented invention that it would be inequitable to find liability. Westinghouse v. 
Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537, 562 (1898); Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genen­
tech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The doctrine would make no sense if patents did not 
cover later-developed technologies at all. 
33. Laser Alignment, 491 F.2d at 866. 
34. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997), holds that 
reasonable interchangeability of elements and accused products in the doctrine of equivalents is 
determined at the time of infringement, not earlier. 
35. P atent Jaw strongly encourages prompt filing once an invention is made. Unreasonable 
delay in filing a patent application after the invention is made will defeat a claim to priority under 35 
U.S.C. § 102(g) (2000). Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (delay caused by attorney 
backlog was not excusable). Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), a one-year grace period is given after an 
inventor makes some public use or sale of the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000). But European 
Jaw has no similar grace period, giving patent applicants a strong incentive to file as soon as possi­
ble after invention, and in any event before selling the invention or publishing it. 
36. Allison & Lemley, Who's Patenting What?, supra note 10, at 2101 (patent prosecution 
takes 2.77 years on average); Lemley & Moore, supra note 10, at 113 (1.38% of all applications 
spend eight or more years in prosecution). 
37. Allison & Lemley, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 237 (finding that, on average, 
12.3 years elapse between the filing of a patent application and the resolution of an infringement 
suit). To be sure, much of this time is spent in litigation after infringement has already occurred. Cf 
John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435 (2004) (finding that most patent lawsuits 
are filed rather quickly after the patent issues). But infringement generally continues during the 
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depending on the time at which the courts define them. Under these long­
standing principles, we cannot define the meaning of a patent claim in the 
abstract. Instead, a patent claim has different meanings depending on the 
reason we ask the question. 
B. Defining Patent Claims Consistently 
A second, equally venerable principle of patent law makes it clear that 
patent claims are to be construed consistently for validity and infringement 
purposes. B oth patent owners and accused infringers have a strong incentive 
to interpret patent claims differently for different purposes. Patent owners 
would like their patent claims to be construed broadly in infringement pro­
ceedings, so that they cover defendants' products, but would generally like 
their claims to be construed narrowly when it comes to validity, to avoid the 
risk of either treading on the prior art or claiming more than the patentee has 
enabled or described. Accused infringers want the opposite-patents that are 
narrow and not infringed, but are broad enough to run afoul of §§ 102, 103, 
or 112. 
The court has rejected efforts by both patentees and accused infringers 
to read patent claims inconsistently when it benefits them to do so. Rather, 
the claims of a particular patent must be read consistently in a particular 
case. The Federal Circuit has repeatedly rejected efforts by litigants to argue 
for one meaning in the validity context and a different meaning in the in­
fringement context.38 To paraphrase Donald Chisum, obviousness, 
enablement, and infringement are an "eternal golden braid" bound together 
by the language of the patent claims.39 For the doctrines to be consistent, the 
claims obviously must have a consistent meaning for each patent. And in­
deed on at least one occasion the Federal Circuit has departed from the 
principles discussed in the last Section in order to ensure that a claim mean­
ing was consistent over time. In Kopykake Enterprises, Inc. v. Lucks Co. , it 
held that "when a patent claim term understood to have a narrow meaning 
when the application is filed later acquires a broader definition, the literal 
scope of the term is limited to what it was understood to mean at the time of 
filing."40 Inferential support for this result can also be found in Texas Digital, 
pendency of the suit, so the "time of infringement" may actually encompass a range of dates begin­
ning on the date the defendant starts making the product and extending many years into litigation. 
38. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2001); Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2001) ("Be­
cause the claims of a patent measure the invention at issue, the claims must be interpreted and given 
the same meaning for purposes of both validity and infringement analysis."); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M3 
Sys., Inc., 157 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Beachcombers Int'I, Inc. v. WildeWood Creative Prods., 
Inc., 31F.3d 1154 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
39. Donald S. Chisum, Anticipation, Enablement and Obviousness: An Eternal Golden 
Braid, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 57 (1987). Chisum refers to anticipation and obviousness, but the logic of the 
braid extends to infringement as well. See Roy H. Wepner, The Patent Invalidity/Infringement Paral­
lel: Symmetry or Semantics?, 93 DICK. L. REV. 67 (1988). 
40. Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). But see Su­
perguide Corp. v. DirecTV Enters., Inc., 358 F.3d 870 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (concluding that Kopykake 
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where the court explained that the dictionaries and treatises courts could use 
in defining claim terms were those published at the time the patent issued, 
not those published later. 41 This approach makes sense only if the term has a 
meaning that is fixed in time. 
In practice, courts have approached claim construction as if the claims 
had a single meaning throughout time. After the Supreme Court determined 
that claim construction was a question of law for the court, 42 district courts 
began the now-ubiquitous practice of holding pretrial "Markman hearings" 
in which they explicated the meaning of patent claims. In my experience, 
courts use Markman hearings to define claim terms in a single way. They do 
not define those terms differently for different purposes. I have never been 
involved in or even heard of a case in which the court defined the same term 
in two different ways for purposes of different sections of the patent statute, 
despite the case law discuss�d in the last Section suggesting that courts 
should do exactly that. Indeed, I am not even aware of attorneys who have 
argued in a Markman hearing that a particular term should have different 
meanings for different purposes. As a practical matter, lawyers and courts 
seem to ignore the cases discussed in the previous Section, except perhaps 
to choose one particular time at which to fix the meaning in any given case. 
The idea that words should have a consistent meaning also has strong in­
tuitive resonance. People know--or think we know-what words mean, and 
we resist the postmodern idea that meanings are contingent and can change 
over time. This is particularly true in science, where we like to think that the 
rules are fixed and unyielding. 43 While the postmodernists are obviously 
right to some extent-the meaning of words is contextually driven and so­
cially constructed-instinct tells us that to conclude that the same words in 
the same document have different meanings for different purposes leads us 
by the short road to chaos. 
II. C HOOSING BETWEEN THE APPROAC HES 
Which approach is right? In this Part, I argue that courts should take a 
unified approach to claim construction, interpreting patent claims as they 
would have been understood by one of ordinary skill in the art at the time 
the patent application was first filed. Section II.A explains why a unified 
approach is preferable to variable meanings. I also argue in that Section that 
was limited to circumstances in which the patentee had expressly limited its invention to "conven­
tional" or existing technology). 
41. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Other Federal 
Circuit panels have suggested different times besides issuance at which meaning should be tested. In 
E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003), the court suggested that the date 
of application might be the correct date, or possibly even the date of invention. Id. at 1367 n.2. The 
discussion in that case was dictum, however, because the court noted that the meaning of the terms 
at issue had not changed over time. 
42. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996). 
43. But cf. PETER GALISON, How EXPERIMENTS END (1987) (discussing how context and 
expectation affect scientific experiments). 
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courts should take a uniform approach in all cases, not just those few cases 
in which a conflict actually arises between different meanings. Section 11.B 
argues that the meaning of the claims should be fixed as of the time of filing 
and deals with some complications that arise from the prosecution process. 
Section 11.C explains why a focus on filing date won't undermine patent 
incentives in the important case of later-developed technology. 
A. Justifying Unified Claim Construction 
The complex of rules described in Part I.A has considerable theoretical 
appeal.44 In the abstract, it may make sense to judge the meaning of a patent 
claim term from different perspectives for different purposes.45 But doing so 
is simply not practical. Adherence to the different meanings approach cre­
ates unsolvable problems in actually litigating and deciding patent cases. We 
managed to avoid confronting those problems for many years because we 
handed the entire question of claim construction to the jury, and blithely 
assumed that they understood and applied the complex of timing rules. The 
Markman decision made transparent the process of claim construction, and 
so exposed these difficulties. These practical problems fall into four catego­
ries. 
First, permitting the same claim term to mean different things invites 
gaming of the claim construction process. Both patent owners and accused 
infringers face a tension in patent litigation between their validity arguments 
and their infringement arguments. The more broadly a patent is interpreted, 
the more likely it is to be infringed, but the more likely it also is to be inva­
lid. Patent owners will try to avoid this tension by arguing that the invention 
should be construed narrowly for validity purposes but broadly for in­
fringement purposes; accused infringers will argue the opposite. These 
arguments may prove more persuasive than one might think; empirical evi­
dence suggests that factfinders in patent cases tend to vote on party rather 
than issue lines, ruling entirely for or against a patentee.46 Courts foreclose 
these efforts to have it both ways by demanding that parties define claim 
terms consistently throughout a lawsuit. If they can't do that, it will prove 
44. I am no fan of simplicity merely for the sake of simplicity and in fact have argued else­
where that patent law needs fewer bright-line rules and more flexible standards that can adapt to the 
complex, industry-specific environment of innovation. See DAN L. Buruc & MARK A LEMLEY, 
TAILORING INNOVATION LAW: SHAPING PATENT POLICY FOR SPECIFIC INDUSTRIES (forthcoming 
2006). The right question, as always, is comparative: what do we gain and what do we lose from 
making a particular rule more complex? 
45. Or it may not. The automatic extension of patent scope over time as the meaning of 
words changes can do significant damage to social welfare, as it threatened to do in the Chiron case. 
46. See Allison & Lemley, Empirical Evidence, supra note 10, at 245 (finding that in cases 
involving multiple patents, factfinders held the patents either all valid or all invalid in 86.7% of the 
cases). Indeed, the Federal Circuit has several times confronted cases in which the jury apparently 
treated the claims differently for validity and infringement purposes in order to rule for the same 
party on both issues. See, e.g., Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316 (Fed. Cir. 
2001); Motorola, Inc. v. Interdigital Tech. Corp., 121 F.3d 1461, 1466 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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difficult to avoid having the parties twist the meaning of words in ways that 
support their interests in a particular case. 
Second, defining patent claim terms to mean different things for differ­
ent purposes significantly complicates the efforts of competitors to predict 
the scope and validity of patents. In recent years, the Federal Circuit has 
repeatedly emphasized the notice function of patent claims, limiting the 
reach of patent law's doctrine of equivalents because of concerns that com­
petitors could not predict how that doctrine might be applied. 47 To be sure, 
there are many problems with the notice function of patents. It is not clear 
that competitors actually read patents, 48 and even if they do the existing 
opacity of claim construction and the doctrine of equivalents make it diffi­
cult already to predict the scope of a competitor's patents. 49 Making claim 
construction even more convoluted will hardly help matters. 
Third, defining patent claim terms to mean different things for different 
purposes would complicate the modem practice of Markman hearings. 
Courts normally construe patent claims at a separate hearing held in advance 
of trial or summary judgment. 50 In theory, at least, they construe those claim 
terms based on the understanding of the PHOSITA and without focusing on 
how the construction of the term will affect the outcome of the case.51 
In order to construe claims differently for different purposes, courts would 
have to abandon this rule, because they would be unable to define the 
47. See, e.g., McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) ("The object of the patent law 
in requiring the patentee to [distinctly claim an invention] is not only to secure to him all to which 
he is entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still left open to them."); Sage Prods., Inc. v. 
Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 
951 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("[C)laims . . .  put[) competitors on notice of the scope of the claimed inven­
tion."). 
48. There are two reasons why lawyers discourage their clients from reading competitors' 
patents. First, if a client is aware of a patent that might constitute prior art to its own invention, it 
must disclose that patent to the PTO, complicating the client's efforts to obtain its own patents. 
Second, if a client becomes aware of a patent that covers its product and continues to make that 
product, it may be held a willful infringer liable for treble damages. See Mark A. Lemley & Ragesh 
K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law's Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TucH. L.J. 1085 (2003). W hile the 
Federal Circuit changed the law in 2004 to eliminate the obligation to waive privilege by obtaining a 
legal opinion and disclosing it to the court whenever put on notice of a patent, see Knorr-Bremse 
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane), as a 
practical matter there are still strong reasons to obtain and disclose such letters and therefore waive 
privilege once one learns of a patent. The disincentive to read patents therefore persists. 
49. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 2; John R. Thomas, Claim Re-Construction: The Doc­
trine of Equivalents in the Post-Markman Era, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 153 (2005). 
50. There is no obligation to hold such a hearing before construing the patent claims, see 
Ballard Med. Prods. v. Allegiance Healthcare Corp., 268 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2001), but the 
overwhelming majority of district courts do so. 
51. Swimways Corp. v. Overbreak LLC, 354 F. Supp. 2d 637, 641 (E.D. Va. 2005) ("[l]n no 
instance should claims be construed in light of the allegedly infringing device; it is only after the 
patent claims have been properly construed that they are applied to the accused device to determine 
whether infringement exists."). See also JOHN w. SCHLICHER, PATENT LAW: LEGAL AND EcoNOMIC 
PRINCIPLES I :44 (2004 ). However, Schlicher notes that judges may look at the accused device in 
order to understand and focus the claim construction process, and the line between these two is 
elusive. 
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meaning of a term until they knew why the meaning mattered-for obvi­
ousness, enablement, or infringement purposes. It would also add to the 
administrative burden on district court judges. Busy district court judges 
already resist being asked to determine the meaning of multiple terms in 
multiple claims, particularly in the large fraction of cases that involve multi­
ple patents. They require parties to select representative patents and 
representative claims for decision, demand that parties agree on the mean­
ings of all but a few claim terms, and impose significant limits on briefing 
and argument over claim terms (imposing a twenty-five page limit on brief­
ing regardless of the number of claim terms at issue, for example).52 These 
judges are likely to resist expanding their Markman role to construe each 
disputed term two or more times; even if they do so, the result will be to 
make Markman hearings longer and more complex. 
Finally, even if judges are willing to add to the complexity of claim con­
struction, their contingent constructions of particular terms are likely to 
confuse the jury. The court will have to instruct the jury that the same term 
means different things for different purposes. Juries may or may not under­
stand this instruction, which is likely to strike them as counterintuitive, but 
at a minimum it will make their burden of deciding patent cases more oner­
ous. 
These costs are potentially substantial. Whether they are worth incurring 
depends largely on whether the different-constructions approach offers sub­
stantial benefits, an issue to which I tum in the next Section. Before I do, 
however, it is worth considering a hybrid approach. One of the reasons 
courts and commentators have succeeded in ignoring the tension I describe 
in this paper is that relatively few cases actually present the conflict directly. 
The conflict only arises in those cases in which both infringement and valid­
ity are at issue, and the meaning of a claim term changes between invention 
and infringement in an outcome-determinative way. One possible approach 
would be to maintain the existing temporally-driven rules for the ordinary 
case, but to apply a uniform standard in the minority of cases in which the 
change in the meaning of the terms would affect the outcome of the case.53 
The Federal Circuit seemed to take this approach in Kopykake,54 where it 
demanded uniformity in the case before it without rejecting the general 
principle that the meaning of patent claim terms should be judged at differ­
ent times for different purposes. And in Inverness it noted that "[o]ur 
decisions have not always been consistent" with respect to the timing of 
52. See, e.g., Standing Order for Patent Cases 'll 5, Sept. 7, 2004 (standing order of 
Judge Jeffrey S. White of the Northern District of California), available at http:// 
www.cand.uscourts.gov/cand/judges.nsf/f439a7615af0ad8188256d48005fd22b/25fd69a0d98a3c7f88256d 
48005ffdcd$FILF/Standing% 200rders%20for%20Patent% 20Cases%20-%20JSW.pdf (last visited June 
7, 2005). 
53. This approach, like my preferred approach, would still require deciding from what per­
spective that uniform standard will be tested, albeit in a smaller group of cases. I discuss that issue 
in the next Section. 
54. Kopykake Enters., Inc. v. Lucks Co., 264 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
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claim construction, but declined to resolve that inconsistency because the 
meaning of the term was the same at all relevant times in the case before it.55 
I think this hybrid approach is insufficient. It complicates claim con­
struction even more than the temporally-driven approach does. The hybrid 
approach requires courts to determine the meaning of some claim terms at 
different times, incurring some of the complexity and gaming costs de­
scribed above. In addition, it imposes a second layer of rules to be applied to 
some but not all claim constructions. The meaning of patent claims can't be 
determined ex ante at all, because neither competitors nor the courts can 
know whether the uniform rule or the variant rule would apply until they 
determined whether two different meanings would be at issue in the particu­
lar case that comes before the court. The meaning of a term would exist in a 
sort of quantum superposition, collapsing to a particular meaning fixed at a 
particular point in time only when the factfinder makes the decision to 
look.56 The hybrid approach might also mean that even for the same pur­
pose, the same term may take on different meanings in cases against 
different defendants. The meaning for, say, infringement purposes would be 
fixed at a uniform time (the filing date) in one case and would be deter­
mined as of the infringement date in another case that didn't present the 
problem of inconsistent meanings.57 Such a result would be uncertain, ma­
nipulable, and intellectually unsatisfying. 
B. Selecting a Time for Determining Claim Meaning 
If the law is to settle on a particular time at which the meaning of claim 
terms should be determined, what should that time be? There are four obvi­
ous choices, mapping to the four different times at which the law currently 
fixes meaning: at the time of invention, at the time of filing, at the time of 
issue, or at the time of infringement. As I noted in Section I.A, courts have 
used each approach in different contexts. Courts that seem to apply a uni­
form standard have often set that standard as of the time the patent issues, 
looking to dictionaries from that time,58 though other Federal Circuit panels 
55. Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1373, 1378 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
56. This was the fate of Schrtidinger's unfortunate (and mercifully apocryphal) cat. See, e.g. , 
JOHN GRIBBIN, IN SEARCH OF SCHRODINGER'S CAT: QUANTUM PHYSICS AND REALITY (1984). Re­
gardless whether the cat would truly be both alive and dead, a question upon which physicists 
disagree, the claim construction would exist in an ambiguous state until we knew the context of the 
lawsuit in which the claim would be construed. 
57. This latter problem is likely to come up only in a few cases since, if a term has changed 
meanings over time in an outcome-determinative way, those changes are likely to come up in each 
subsequent infringement case. 
58. Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The role of 
dictionaries was sharply limited by the Federal Circuit en bane this year. Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 
03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. July 12, 2005) (en bane). But dictionar­
ies will still be relevant in some circumstances under the Phillips standard, and so determining the 
proper date for the dictionary still matters. 
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have suggested that the invention date or the filing date might be the appro­
priate measure.
59 In this Section, I argue that the best option is to determine 
the meaning of patent claim terms as of the date the patent application is 
filed. 
To begin, it seems rather easy to dismiss the idea that the meaning of 
claim terms should be defined for all purposes as of the date of infringe­
ment. Doing so would require the scope of patents to change over time, not 
only for infringement purposes (in which we have long accepted just such 
an oddity)60 but also for validity purposes. The PTO would never be able to 
determine the validity of a patent, since the meaning of the patent claims 
could not be fixed at a point in time. Even after it issued, a patent's scope 
would not be fixed, but could differ from infringer to infringer as time 
passes. As a result, the same patent could be valid at certain times and inva­
lid at others, depending on the meaning of terms at the time of infringement. 
Further, claims valid at the time of issuance would become invalid for lack 
of enablement as the meaning of those claim terms changed. As the Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals warned in In re Hogan, "[t]here cannot, in an 
effective patent system, be such a burden placed on the right to broad 
claims."61 No court has suggested that the meaning of patent claims for va­
lidity purposes should be mutable over time in this way, and the debilitating 
uncertainty associated with these changes counsels against adopting it. 
A second possibility is that the meaning of patent claim terms could be 
fixed as of the time the patent issues. Texas Digital implicitly took this ap­
proach, though it did not justify it expressly. The Federal Circuit has also 
endorsed use of the issue date in other cases as well.62 Using the date of is­
sue has a certain logic to it; after all, it is as of the issue date that the 
language of the patent claims is established in fixed form, so perhaps it 
makes sense that that is the date on which we should define the meaning of 
those claims. Nonetheless, I do not think issue date is the right choice. A 
substantial period of time can elapse between the time the patent is filed and 
when it issues. While the time a patent spends in prosecution is 2.77 years 
on average,63 litigated patents spend substantially more time (3.6 years on 
average),64 and a small but important subset of patents spend eight or more 
59. Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); E­
Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp., 343 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 
274 F.3d 1336, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 
2000); see also Universal Oil P rods. Co. v. Globe Oil & Ref. Co., 137 F.2d 3, 6 (7th Cir. 1943) 
("[T]he meaning which the inventor gives to his words can not [sic) be made to depend upon subse­
quent events, but should appear when the application is filed."). 
60. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 37 (1997). 
61. In re Hogan, 559 F.2d 595, 606 (C.C.P.A. 1977). 
62. See, e.g., Inverness Med. Switz. GmbH v. Warner Lambert Co., 309 F.3d 1 373, 1378 n.2 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (choosing issue date, but noting the conflict and concluding that it didn't matter for 
the resolution of this case). 
63. Allison & Lemley, Who's Patenting What?, supra note IO, at 2118. 
64. Allison & Lemley, Empirical Evidence, supra note IO, at 237. 
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years in prosecution.65 Importantly, if a patent spends a long time in prose­
cution, it is generally because the applicant has voluntarily chosen to extend 
prosecution by filing multiple continuation applications.66 The fact that the 
patentee has substantial power to control when the patent issues and with 
what claims
67 
gives rise to concerns about gaming the system. In Chiron v. 
Genentech, for example, Chiron filed a patent application in 1984, but re­
wrote the claims of the still-pending patent in 1999 to cover "monoclonal 
antibodies," a term that had a very different and much broader meaning in 
1999 than it did in 1984.68 Giving that term its 1999 meaning is unfair in two 
respects: it may disadvantage competitors by allowing the patentee to in­
clude within the scope of the patent technologies she did not invent, and it 
may disadvantage the patentee by imposing an impossible burden of de­
scribing and enabling, as of 1984, technologies that were not developed 
until much later.69 The prospect of such manipulation by patent owners 
counsels against defining patent terms as of the issue date. Issue date would 
also seem an odd choice because it is not normally the default in the tempo­
ral-differences model. Only the interpretation of the support in the patent 
specification for a means-plus-function claim is tested as of the time of issu­
ance, so adopting the issue date would require a greater change in practice 
than other baselines. Finally, setting the meaning of terms as of the issue 
date would effectively foreclose any possibility of claim construction at the 
PTO, since it would have to construe a term whose meaning wouldn't be 
established until after it was done examining the claim. The PTO doesn't 
engage in claim construction today, applying instead the "broadest reason­
able construction" that can be given to a claim.70 But commentators have 
suggested that it could do so,7 1 something that would be feasible only if the 
meaning of a claim term were fixed sometime before prosecution was com­
pleted. 
65. Lemley & Moore, supra note 10, at 113 (stating that l .38% of all patents spend more 
than eight years in prosecution). 
66. Id. ; see also Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 
AIPLA Q.J. 369 (1994) (finding that half of the patents that spend the most time in prosecution are 
submarine patents). 
67. See, e.g. , Lemley & Moore, supra note 10 (explaining how patentees can use continua­
tion practice to control when and if the patent issues, and to wear down examiners who object to 
particular claims). 
68. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1172 (E.D. Cal. 2002). 
69. Indeed, both of these things happened in Chiron: the court found infringement because it 
gave "monoclonal antibodies" its broader 1999 meaning, but ultimately invalidated the patent on 
enablement and written description grounds. Id. at 1192. The written description decision was af­
firmed by the Federal Circuit. Chiron Corp. v. Genentech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
70. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech. Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
71. See Joseph Scott Miller & James A. Hilsenteger, The Proven Key: Roles and Rules for 
Dictionaries in the Patent Office and the Courts, 54 AM. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript 
on file with author) (arguing that an applicant should have to commit to definitions of terms during 
patent prosecution). 
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This leaves us with two options-determining the meaning of claims as 
of the time of invention or the time of filing. Both seem plausible to me. 
Both are widely used already in the temporal-differences model.12 Both are 
focused at or about the time the invention is made, which seems the logical 
time to base at least validity determinations. I am inclined to believe that the 
filing date is the right choice. It is a fundamental rule of claim construction 
that the patentee can be her own lexicographer.73 To do so, the patentee de­
fines the claim terms in the specification at the time of filing. The patentee 
hasn't written the claims yet at the time of invention, and if the invention is 
truly innovative it may take time to come up with the right terminology.74 
Choosing the time of filing gives the PHOSITA some time to learn the 
meaning of new terms as knowledge of the invention diffuses through the 
scientific community and permits the patentee an opportunity to help deter­
mine the meaning of those claim terms. Subsequent discussion in the 
prosecution history can clarify what the terms meant when filed, but it is the 
time of filing that should be the key. Finally, it is easy to determine the date 
of filing, and harder to determine the date of invention. Indeed, if we move 
to a first to file system, as seems possible at this writing,7� the date of inven­
tion will be irrelevant for almost all purposes, and it would be better not to 
have to identify that date for purposes of claim construction. 
Choosing either the time of invention or the time of filing requires us to 
deal with one potential anomaly: patent claims can be amended after the 
time of filing. What happens when a claim term is added after filing? This 
can occur in three different settings. First, a patentee might file a reissue 
application, seeking different claim language. A reissue patent relates back 
to the original if it does not broaden the claims, but is subject to intervening 
72. A number of cases rely on the filing date as the relevant date for claim construction. See, 
e.g. , PC Connector Solutions LLC v. Smartdisk Corp., 406 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Bayer AG v. 
Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Schering Corp. v. Amgen Inc., 222 F.3d 1 347, 
1353 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1 998) (en 
bane) (Mayer, C.J., concurring). Other cases rely on the invention date. See, e.g., Metabolite Labs., 
Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); ResQNet.com, Inc. v. Lansa, 
Inc., 346 F.3d 1374, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Rexnord Corp. v. Laitram Corp., 274 F.3d 1336, 1342 
(Fed. Cir. 2001). The Federal Circuit's en bane decision in Markman is frequently cited by district 
courts for the proposition that the meaning of claims is determined at the time of the invention. See, 
e.g., Microstrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 331 F. Supp. 2d 432 (E.D. Va. 2004); Honeywell Int'!, 
Inc. v. ITT Indus., Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 865 (E.D. Mich. 2004); Agere Sys., Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., 
No. Civ.A.03-3 138, 2004 WL 1 658530 (E.D. Pa. July 20, 2004). 
73. See, e.g., Johnson Worldwide Assocs., Inc. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 
1999); cf Miller & Hilsenteger, supra note 71 (arguing that patentees should pick a dictionary as of 
their filing date to be used to construe the patent). 
74. An additional problem with invention date is that figuring out when an invention is made 
turns out to be complicated, based on a combination of conception dates, reduction to practice dates, 
diligence in reduction to practice, and abandonment after reduction to practice. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) 
(2000). Courts need to make these determinations only in a small subset of cases, see Mark A. Lem­
ley & Colleen V. Chien, Are the U.S. Patent Priority Rules Really Necessary?, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 
1 299 (2003), and it would be simpler if we didn't force them to do so in other cases. 
75. See H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005) (proposing to change to a first-inventor-to­
file system). 
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rights if it does broaden the claims.76 A reissue application should count as a 
new filing for purposes of the date at which meaning is to be determined 
only if it is a broadening reissue whose effective date is later than the origi­
nal patent. Second, a patentee might add new material to the specification to 
accompany the claims by filing what is called a "continuation-in-part" ap­
plication. In this case the solution is easy-the "filing date" of a CIP 
application is the date the matter supporting the particular claim term is 
added to the patent. Finally, a patent applicant may amend her claims during 
prosecution without changing the specification. If she does, the new claims 
must find support in the initial application. While the claims may be added 
during prosecution, they presumably have a meaning based on the specifica­
tion written at the time of filing, so the focus on filing date shouldn't prove 
problematic. If it is-if the patent includes claim terms that would not be 
understood by the PHOSITA at the time of filing based either on his outside 
knowledge or on the disclosures of the s�ecification-the patent claim is 
invalid in any event for lack of enablement. 7 
The Federal Circuit may have made the right choice in its recent en bane 
decision in Phillips. 78 That opinion says: "We have made clear, moreover, 
that the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that 
the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in question at the 
time of the invention, i.e., as of the effective filing date of the patent applica­
tion." 19 The issue was not briefed in the case, and the court did not cite the 
numerous cases holding the contrary. So it is possible to dismiss this state­
ment as dictum. Further, the fact that the court seemed to think invention 
date and filing date were the same leaves its precise conclusion a bit uncer­
tain. Nonetheless, I am optimistic that the court's statement reflects not only 
a resolution of the conflicting case law, but the correct resolution.80 
C. The Scope of Patents Under a Filing-Date Standard 
Choosing to define patent claim terms as they would be understood at 
the time the patent application was filed means that the literal meaning of 
76. 35 u.s.c. § 252 (2000). 
77. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. l (2000) requires that the patentee teach a person of ordinary skill 
in the art how to make and use the invention without undue experimentation. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 
731 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
78. Phillips v. AWH Corp., No. 03-1269, 03-1286, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 13954 (Fed. Cir. 
July 12, 2005) (en bane). 
79. Id. at *22 (emphasis added). 
80. The Federal Circuit has recently resolved many of the conflicts that characterized its 
jurisprudence in the 1990s, lending more clarity and predictability to patent law. In addition to this 
issue, see id. (resolving the dispute over interpretive sources for claim construction); Knorr-Bremse 
Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en bane) (re­
solving problematic rules regarding willfulness); Johnson & Johnston Assocs., Inc. v. R.E. Serv. 
Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en bane) (resolving conflict over doctrine of dedication to the 
public domain); Burk & Lemley, Inherency, supra note 17 (discussing the court's recent clarification 
of the inherency doctrine). 
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patent claims will not expand over time as the meaning of those terms 
changes.81 Cases like Hogan and Chiron that expand the literal meaning of 
those claims, creating a "temporal disparity" between meaning for validity 
purposes and meaning for infringement purposes,82 will have to be rejected.83 
Some will consider this a good thing because it reduces the likelihood of 
blocking patents8 4 and limits the ability of patent "trolls" to claim to own 
something that they did not in fact invent.85 But limiting inventors to owning 
what they thought of can also present problems, particularly for pioneering 
inventions at an early stage in the development of a technology. The protec­
tion provided by a patent may be hollow if it does not confer the ability to 
prevent logical applications of the principle of the invention to new and un­
foreseen circumstances.86 
This does not mean, however, that the patents themselves cannot cover 
later-developed technologies. Patentees can use the doctrine of equivalents 
to reach such technologies. Indeed, covering equivalent technology not con­
templated when the patent claims were written is one of the major benefits 
of the doctrine of equivalents. While the Federal Circuit has gone to signifi­
cant lengths in recent years to cabin the scope of the doctrine of equivalents 
in order to prevent abuse of the doctrine, those restrictions have little or no 
application to the case of later-developed technology. The doctrine of prose­
cution history estoppel, which precludes a patentee who narrows her claims 
from later recapturing that ground under the doctrine of equivalents,87 con­
tains an exception permitting the doctrine of equivalents to apply to 
technologies that were not reasonably foreseeable at the time the claims 
8 1 .  The effective scope of those claims may still expand over time for another reason: com­
petitors may develop new products unknown at the time of the patentee's invention that fit within 
the literal language of the patent claims. Thus, a patentee may claim a genus consisting of 1 ,000 
species, including some that neither the patentee nor anyone else has specifically identified. Over 
time, as new species within the genus are discovered, the practical scope of the patent is broadened 
to cover new products. But the legal scope of the claimed invention remains the same. 
82. Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent District: Observations on the Grady· 
Alexander Thesis, 78 VA. L. REv. 359, 379 n.73 ( 1992). 
83. Some decisions have taken the position that meaning is "axiomatically" the same for 
purposes of validity and infringement, an approach that impliedly rejects Hogan. See, e.g., Smith· 
Kline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp.,  403 F.3d 1 33 1  (Fed. Cir. 2005); Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst 
Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 1 4  F.3d 13 13,  1 330 (Fed. Cir. 2003). Indeed, Judge Bryson, concurring in 
Chiron, would have reached this result expressly, construing the patent claims "as they would have 
been understood by one of skill in the art at the time of the invention, and not construing them to 
reach the as-yet-undeveloped technology that the applicant did not enable." Chiron Corp. v. Genen­
tech, Inc., 363 F.3d 1247, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Bryson, J., concurring); see also In re Hogan, 559 
F.2d 595, 609-1 1 (C.C.P.A. 1977) (Miller, J., concurring in part). This approach, with which I agree, 
would not have changed who won the Chiron case, but would have changed the basis for that result 
from invalidity to noninfringement. 
84. On blocking patents, see Merges & Nelson, supra note 32. 
85. See, e.g. , Feldman, supra note 12. 
86. See Matthew J. Conigliaro et al., Foreseeability in Patent Law, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1 045 (2001 ). 
. 
87. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 1 7  ( 1 997). 
October 2005] The Changing Meaning 1 2 1  
were changed.ss The rule that the doctrine of equivalents cannot extend to 
cover the prior arts9 will not apply to later-developed technology, which by 
definition cannot be in the prior art. And the doctrine of dedication to the 
public domain, which prevents a patentee from covering under the doctrine 
of equivalents an implementation described in the specification but not 
claimed in the patent,90 by definition will not apply to technologies not con­
templated at the time the patent was filed. Freed of these substantial 
limitations, the doctrine of equivalents remains robust enough to take the 
place of decisions like Hogan in ensuring that pioneering patents retain ef­
fective scope as improvers develop next-generation technologies. 
The corollary concerns the continued importance of the reverse doctrine 
of equivalents. The reverse doctrine of equivalents is a rare but potentially 
important defense to infringement where the accused infringer has radically 
improved the patented technology.91 The Federal Circuit has recently ques­
tioned the continuing vitality of the doctrine, however. In Tate Access 
Floors, Judge Gajarsa suggested that the limitations of § 1 12 obviated the 
need for the reverse doctrine of equivalents because they prevented patent­
ees from including later-developed technologies within the literal scope of 
the patent.92 Under existing law, this is not true. Because the meaning of 
claim terms for § 1 12 purposes is determined at the time of filing, while the 
meaning for infringement purposes is determined later, the literal scope of 
the patent may expand over time in ways that the enablement and written 
description requirements cannot effectively control. Were the court to adopt 
a clear rule of uniform meaning, this problem would go away, and the re­
verse doctrine of equivalents would become less important.93 
88. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Festo 
Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en bane); see 
also Conigliaro et al., supra note 86. 
89. See, e.g., Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677 (Fed. 
Cir. 1 990); cf. Tate Access Floors, Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1367 
(Fed. Cir. 2002) (limiting Wilson to doctrine of equivalents cases; if literal claims of a patent cover 
the prior art the remedy is to hold the claims invalid). 
90. Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co., 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (en bane). 
9 1 .  See Lemley, supra note 32; Merges, supra note 32; Robert P. Merges, A Brief Note on 
Blocking Patents and Reverse Equivalents: Biotechnology as an Example, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. Soc'v 878 (1991). 
92. Tate Access Floors, 279 F.3d at 1368. Since that decision the Federal Circuit has made 
reference to the reverse doctrine of equivalents on several occasions, however, suggesting its contin­
ued vitality. See, e.g., Biogen, Inc. v. Berlex Labs., Inc., 3 1 8  F.3d 1 132 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Plant 
Genetic Sys., N.V. v. DeKalb Genetics Corp., 315  F.3d 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Amgen Inc. v. 
Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 14  F.3d 1 3 1 3  (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
93. It still wouldn't be the case that the doctrine served no purpose, however. Even with 
unified meaning, the reverse doctrine of equivalents will still be important in cases in which the 
accused infringer makes a radical improvement that clearly falls within the meaning of the claims as 
written. But the number of cases in which the reverse doctrine might apply would decline. 
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Ill. CONCLUSION 
Two different, conflicting legal regimes for construing patent claims 
have coexisted for some time. The growth of Markman hearings heightens 
this conflict by requiring express claim construction by judges. The Federal 
Circuit must choose between the benefits of integrated claim construction 
and the niceties of time-differentiated claim construction. The only practical 
approach is to abandon differentiation in the interest of a simple, internally 
consistent understanding of patent claims. 
The logical way to unify the meaning of patent claim terms is to fix that 
meaning at the time of filing. Doing so does not mean we have to aban­
don the principle that patents can cover later-developed technologies, 
though it does mean we must seek the source of that principle in the doc­
trine of equivalents rather than · in the accident of changing meaning. 
That's a feature of my approach, not a bug. The original purpose of the 
doctrine of equivalents was to reach later-developed technologies,94 and 
it is still most effective in doing so. The benefit we will gain from giving 
patent claims a consistent meaning is substantial. 
94. Martin J. Adelman & Gary L. Francione, The Doctrine of Equivalents in Patent Law: 
Questions That Pennwalt Did Not Answer, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 673 (1989). 
